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CASES NOTED
immediately preceeding an injury, and the court by so doing, usurped the
power of the jury to decide in such cases who was or was not at fault.
If this decision is followed to any extent, Florida will have the rather
dubious honor of being the only state allowing a negligent defendant to
shield himself behind an emergency created by his own negligence. 12
FRANx J. GRENE
TORTS-DAMAGES-SURVIVAL STATUTES
The plaintiff, suing under the Wrongful Death Act' for the negligent
death of his wife, alleged as damages the loss of his wife's future earnings.
The trial judge disallowed this item of damages on the theory that the
husband had no legal right to the wife's earnings. The plaintiff then
instituted this action, as administrator, under the Florida Survival Statute,2
attempting to recover for the estate the pecuniary loss through impairment
of earning power the deceased could have recovered had she lived. Held,
there can be no recovery for prospective damage to the estate under the
Florida Survival Statute. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1955).
At common law a person damaged by the negligent death of another
could maintain no action against the wrongdoer.3 In 1846, England passed
a remedial statute under which specified beneficiaries could recover from
a person whose "wrongful act, neglect, or default" caused the death of
another.4 Most of the so-called wrongful death acts enacted in this country
are patterned after the English statute and use similar language in fixing
the grounds upon which such damages may be recovered.5 Predominantly,
12. Lanier v. Johnson, 186 Va. 191, 42 S.E.2d 319-1 Saunders v. Temple, 154
Va.714, 153 S.E. 691 (1930).
1. FLA. STAT. §§" 768.01-.02 (1953) "Whenever the death of any person in this
State shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence; carelessness or default of any
individual . . . and is such as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the
party injured thereby to maintain an action. . . . and to recover damages in respect
thereof, then, and in every such case the person . . , who would have been liable indamages if death had not ensued . . . shall be liable in damages notwithstanding the
death of the person injured .... Every action shall be brought by and in the name
of the widow or husband - . .and in every such action the jury shall give such damages
as the party or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the
party killed."
2. Fi.A. STAT. § 45.11 (1953). "All actions for personal injuries shall die with
the person, to-wit: Assault and battery, slander, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution; all other actions shall and may he maintained in the name of the repre-
sentatives of the deceased."
3. Chamberlain v. Florida Power Co. 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (19-10); Wilkie
v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1926); Mock v. Evans Light and Ice Co., 88
Fla. 113, 101 So. 203 (1924); Marianna & B. Ry. v. May, 83 Fla. 524, 91 So. 553(1922); Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921).
4. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 VrcT. c. 93.
5. Bowden v. Jacksonville Electric Co., 51 Fla. 1952. 41 So. 400 (1906); Florida
C. & P. Ry. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899); Raisor v. Chicago & A. Ry.,
215 Ill. 47, 74 N.E. 69 (1905); Chicago v. Major, 18 I11. 349, 68 Am. Dec. 553 (1857);
Kelliher v. New York C. & H. R.R., 212 N.Y. 207, 105 N.E. 824 (1914); Alfson v.
Bush Co., 182 N.Y. 193, 75 N.E. 230 (1905).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
American jurisdictions support the theory that such statutes create a
new cause of action in the beneficiary, rather than effecting a revival of
the action for injury to the decedant.0 However, it is essential that the
wrong be one for which the decedant could have sued had he lived 7 The
primary distinction between the wrongful death acts and the survival
legislation is that the former creates a new cause of action for the benefit
of an enumerated group, while the latter merely revives the cause of action
that, at common law, died with the death of the injured party.8 In assessing
damages under the survival statute or the wrongful death acts, the basis
of computation is usually a matter of statutory construction." In jurisdictions
which have both wrongful death acts and general survival statutes, as does
Florida, damages for prospective injury to the estate are usually held to
be recoverable under the wrongful death acts, which, to avoid double
damages, necessarily precludes such recovery under the survival statutes.
Where the remedy is not exclusive, therefore, the recovery under the
survival statute is limited to the damages incurred by the decedant prior
to death.10 The theory behind this award of damages is that the wrongful
death act is the remedy of the beneficiary for the damage to himself by
the death, while the survival legislation authorizes recovery only for the
actual injury to the decedant, who upon leath can be injured no further.
This rationale was aptly stated in Allen v. Burdette,' wherein the court
says, "Where death has actually occurred, the theory of prospective damages
included in such survival claim has no place whatever . . . . What had
been uncertain and speculative became definite and certain ... "
The decision in the case under note follows the majority holding in
states where survival statutes and wrongful death acts are concurrent
remedies. Having established in previous decisions12 that prospective dam-
ages wcre recoverable under the Florida Wrongful Death Act, the Court
6. Gulf C. & S.F. Riy. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913); Fitzpatrick v. Owens,
124 Ark. 167, 186 SV. 832 (1916); Burke v. Arcarta & M. River Ry., 125 Cal. 364,
57 Pac. 1065 (1899); Greco v. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938); Regan
v. Davis, 290 Pa. 167, 138 Atl. 751 (1927).
7. Stringfellow v. Atlantic Coast Line lky., 64 ir.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1933); Obrian
v. Standard Oil of Kentucky, 38 V.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1930); Collins v. ITall. 117 Fla.
282, 157 So. 646 (1934); Carter v. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 83 Fla. 470, 91 So. 893
(1922).
8. English v. United States, 204 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1953); looper Construction
Co. v, Drake, 73 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1954); May Coal Co. v. Robine te. 120 Ohio St. 11R,
163 N.E. 576 (1929),
9. RESIATEMENI, lORTS 925, comment a (1939).
10. Davis v. St. Louis, I3M. & S. Ry.. 53 Ark. 117, 15 S.V. 801 (1891); Stewart
v, United Electric Light & Powc Co., 104 Md. 332. 65 Atl. 49 (1906); Nlahoning
Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 601 (1908); St. Louis & S.F. Rv.
v. Goodc, 42 Okla. 784, 142 Pac. 1185 (1914); Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.1). 201, 151
N.V. 1001 (1915); Brown v. Chicago & N.V. Ry., 102 Wis. 137, 77 NA. 748 (1898).
11. Allen v. Btirdctte, 139 Ohio 208, 39 N.E.2d 153 (1942).
12. English v. United States, 204 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1953); Seaboard Airline Ry.
v. Martin, 56 So. 509 (Fla. 1952); Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213
(1946); Miami Dairy Farms v. Tinsley, 115 Fla. 650, 155 So. 850 (1934); Cudaby
Packing Co. v. Ellis, 105 Fla. 186, 140 So. 918 (1932); Marianna & B. Ry. v. May,
83 Fla. 524, 91 So. 553 (1922).
CASES NOTED
followed other jurisdictions wherein the remedy is not exclusive, and ruled
out such damage under the survival statute. The decision, though consistent
with other jurisdictions, results in an anomaly in that it is cheaper to kill
than to maim under tire Florida statutes. This situation arises in Florida
due to the peculiar wording of the Florida Wrongful Death Act which
allows an action only to the beneficiary, himself, and limits damages to
the anount that the party entitled to sue may have sustained by the
death. Here, where the husband has no legal right to his wife's earnings,
he cannot claim damages for impairment under the wrongful death act.
This situation does not arise in jurisdictions which follow the English
act more closely. Under these acts a representative sues for the benefit
of all beneficiaries; therefore, the judgment is not limited to the amount
recoverable by any one beneficiary.
The anomalous situations presented by this case is, as the court points
out, a matter for legislative action rather than for judicial re-interpretation
of the survival statute.
CHANDLER F. CULVER
WILLS-ILLEGAL CONDITIONS-JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
Testator devised a portion of his estate to his wife for life, residue
to a trustee to pay the income to the wife for life; both subject to the
conditions that the wife not remarry or use the money for the support
of their son. Held, in view of a Connecticut statute' requiring a parent
to support his children if they become poor and unable to support them-
selves, the condition concerning the son is contrary to public policy, is
uncertain, and therefore invalid. Zdanowich v. Shenvood, 19 Conn. Supp.
89, 110 A.2d 290 (1954).
It is generally held that a testator mnay impose any condition in his
will so long as it is definite and does not impose an impossibility or involve
illegality. 2  The test the courts seem to employ is to determine if the
result would induce conduct detrimental to the public interest. For
example, restrictions concerning family relationships that would involve
a breach of parental duty are held to be void; such as a prohibition of
social relations between mother and son,: relinquishing control of a child
to a stranger, 4 or requiring the separation of father and son.5 However, a
I. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2610 (1949), as amended by CoN. C.N. STAT. Sup',.§ lilc (1953).
2. Clemenson v. Resbsamen, 205 Ark. 123, 168 S.W.2d 195 (1943); Thompson
v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1943); In re Houston's Estate, 371 Pa. 396,
89 A.2d 525 (1952).
3. In re Ranney's Estate, 161 Misc. 626, 250 N.Y.Supp. 680 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
4. In re Carplesl Estate, 140 Misc. 459, 250 NX.Supp. 603 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
5. In re Forte's Will, 149 Misc. 327, 267 N.Y.Supp. 603 (Surf. Ct. 1933).
